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GLD-149 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-4234 
___________ 
 
LUTHER S. RYALS, JR., 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
MONTGOMERY COUNTY; MONTGOMERY COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY; 
POTTSTOWN POLICE DEPARTMENT; DOUGLAS B. BREIDENBACH, JR. 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2:12-cv-05439) 
District Judge:  Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 7, 2013 
 
Before:  FUENTES, FISHER and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 15, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Luther Ryals, Jr., a Pennsylvania state prisoner, appeals the dismissal of his 
complaint by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  
 2 
Because the appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily affirm the 
judgment of the District Court.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
I. 
 On September 10, 2008, the Pottstown Police Department arrested Ryals on 
various drug-related charges.  According to Ryals, the magistrate‟s signature on the 
Affidavit of Probable Cause attached to the criminal complaint against him was forged by 
Detective Edward Kropp of the Pottstown Police Department.  Ryals alleged in a 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 complaint that he informed his attorney, Douglas B. Breidenbach, Jr., of 
the alleged forgery before trial commenced on July 28, 2010.  For relief, Ryals requested 
that his sentence be vacated, that he receive $10 million in damages, that Detective Kropp 
be dismissed from the police force, and that his lawyer be suspended from practicing law 
for six to 12 months.
1
  The District Court dismissed his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B).  Ryals then timely filed this appeal. 
II. 
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise 
plenary review over the District Court‟s dismissal order.  See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 
F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to 
state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a 
                                              
1
 We agree with the District Court that Ryals‟ request that his sentence be vacated 
is not cognizable under § 1983 and must be asserted in a habeas corpus petition pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). 
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complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  To survive dismissal, “a complaint must 
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to „state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.‟”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  We may summarily affirm on 
any basis supported by the record.  Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(per curiam). 
III. 
 The District Court properly dismissed Ryals‟ complaint.2  Ryals‟ false arrest and 
imprisonment claims are governed by the two-year limitations period found in 42 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 5524(2).  See Knoll v. Springfield Twp. Sch. Dist., 763 F.2d 584, 585 (3d 
Cir. 1985).  However, under federal law, § 1983 claims accrue “when the plaintiff has a 
complete and present cause of action.”  Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007) 
(citations omitted).  Ryals‟ false arrest and imprisonment claims accrued when he became 
“detained pursuant to legal process.”  Id. at 397.  Even if Ryals was not aware of the 
alleged forgery on September 10, 2008 (the date of his arrest), his complaint and attached 
exhibits indisputably show that he was fully aware of his claim by mid-July 2010.  
However, Ryals did not file his complaint until September 2012.  This was too late. 
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 We agree with the District Court‟s generous construction of Ryals‟ complaint as 
alleging claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and due 
process violations.  See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). 
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Furthermore, we see no reason to toll the statute of limitations.  Unless 
inconsistent with federal law, state law governs the issue of whether a limitations period 
should be tolled.  See Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 1989).  In 
Pennsylvania, the statute of limitations may be tolled by the discovery rule, which applies 
when an injury or its cause was not known or reasonably knowable “despite the exercise 
of due diligence.”  Mest v. Cabot Corp., 449 F.3d 502, 510 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting 
Pocono Int‟l Raceway v. Pocono Produce, Inc., 468 A.2d 468, 471 (Pa. 1983)).  In his 
notice of appeal, Ryals asserts that he did not know of the alleged forgery until July 12, 
2011, when a handwriting examiner agreed that the signature did not appear to be 
authentic.  However, his argument is belied by his complaint‟s exhibits, which indicate 
that he wrote to his attorney regarding the possible forgery in July 2010.  Accordingly, 
the examiner‟s report does not provide a basis for tolling based upon the discovery rule.3 
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, no substantial question is presented and we will affirm 
the judgment of the District Court.
 
 See 3d Cir. L.A.R 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
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 The District Court also properly dismissed Ryals‟ malicious prosecution and due 
process claims.  See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).  Furthermore, the 
District Court did not commit reversible error when it dismissed Ryals‟ complaint 
without offering leave to amend.  We do not see how any amendment to his complaint 
would save his claims.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 
2002). 
